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Abstract. An important task in the analysis of multiagent systems is to understand how groups of selfish players
can form coalitions, i.e., work together in teams. In this paper, we study the dynamics of coalition formation under
bounded rationality. We consider settings where each team’s profit is given by a convex function, and propose
three profit-sharing schemes, each of which is based on the concept of marginal utility. The agents are assumed
to be myopic, i.e., they keep changing teams as long as they can increase their payoff by doing so. We study the
properties (such as closeness to Nash equilibrium or total profit) of the states that result after a polynomial number
of such moves, and prove bounds on the price of anarchy and the price of stability of the corresponding games.
1 Introduction
Cooperation and collaborative task execution are fundamentally important both for human soci-
eties and for multiagent systems. Indeed, it is often the case that certain tasks are too complicated
or resource-consuming to be executed by a single agent, and a collective effort is needed. Such
settings are usually modeled using the framework of cooperative games, which specify the amount
of payoff that each subset of agents can achieve: when the game is played the agents split into
teams (coalitions), and the payoff of each team is divided among its members.
The standard framework of cooperative game theory is static, i.e., it does not explain how the
players arrive at a particular set of teams and a payoff distribution. However, understanding the dy-
namics of coalition formation is an obviously important issue from the practical perspective, and
there is an active stream of research that studies bargaining and coalition formation in cooperative
games (see, e.g. [CDS93,MW95,O96,Y03]). Most of this research assumes that the agents are fully
rational, i.e., can predict the consequences of their actions and maximize their (expected) utility
based on these predictions. However, full rationality is a strong assumption that is unlikely to hold
in many real-life scenarios: first, the agents may not have the computational resources to infer their
optimal strategies, and second, they may not be sophisticated enough to do so, or lack informa-
tion about other players. Such agents may simply respond to their current environment without
worrying about the subsequent reaction of other agents; such behavior is said to be myopic. Now,
coalition formation by computationally limited agents has been studied by a number of researchers
in multi-agent systems, starting with the work of [SK99] and [SL97]. However, myopic behavior
in coalition formation received relatively little attention in the literature (for some exceptions, see
[DS02,CB04,AS09]). In contrast, myopic dynamics of non-cooperative games is the subject of a
growing body of research (see, e.g. [FPT04,AAE+08,FFM08]).
In this paper, we merge these streams of research and apply techniques developed in the context
of analyzing the dynamics of non-cooperative games to coalition formation settings. In doing so,
we depart from the standard model of games with transferable utility, which allows the players
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in a team to share the payoff arbitrarily: indeed, such flexibility will necessitate a complicated
negotiation process whenever a player wants to switch teams. Instead, we consider three payoff
models that are based on the concept of marginal utility, i.e., the contribution that the player makes
to his current team. Each of the payoff schemes, when combined with a cooperative game, induces
a non-cooperative game, whose dynamics can then be studied using the rich set of tools developed
for such games in recent years.
We will now describe our payment schemes in more detail. We assume that we are given a
convex cooperative game, i.e., the values of the teams are given by a submodular function; the
submodularity property means that a player is more useful when he joins a smaller team, and plays
an important role in our analysis. In our first scheme, the payment to each agent is given by his
marginal utility for his current team; by submodularity, the total payment to the team members
never exceeds the team’s value. This payment scheme rewards each agent according to the value
he creates; we will therefore call these games Fair Value games. Our second scheme takes into
account the history of the interaction: we keep track of the order in which the players have joined
their teams, and pay each agent his marginal contribution to the coalition formed by the players
who joined his current team before him. This ensures that the entire payoff of each team is fully
distributed among its members. Moreover, due to the submodularity property a player’s payoff
never goes down as long as he stays with the same team. This payoff scheme is somewhat remi-
niscent of the reward schemes employed in industries with strong labor unions; we will therefore
refer to these games as Labor Union games. Our third scheme can be viewed as a hybrid of the
first two: it distributes the team’s payoff according to the players’ Shapley values, i.e., it pays each
player his expected marginal contribution to a coalition formed by its predecessors when players
are reordered randomly; the resulting games are called Shapley games.
Our contributions We study the equilibria and dynamics of the three games described above.
We are interested in the properties of the states that can be reached by natural dynamics in a
polynomial number of steps: in particular, whether such states are (close to) Nash equilibria, and
whether they result in high total productivity, i.e., the sum of the teams’ values (note that in Fair
Value games the latter quantity may differ from the social welfare, i.e., the sum of players’ payoffs).
We first show that all our games are potential games, and hence admit a Nash equilibium in
pure strategies. We then argue that for each of our games the price of anarchy is bounded by 2. For
the first two classes of games, we can also bound their α-price of anarchy, i.e., the ratio between the
total profit of the optimal coalition structure and that of the worst α-Nash equilibrium, by 2+α. We
also provide bounds on the price of stability for all three games. Further, for the first two classes of
games, we show that the basic Nash dynamic converges in polynomial time to an approximately
optimal state, where the approximation ratio is arbitrarily close to the price of anarchy; these results
extend to basic α-Nash dynamic and α-price of anarchy. To obtain these results, we observe that
both the Fair Value games and the Labor Union games can be viewed as variants of β-nice games
introduced in [AAE+08], and prove general convergence results for such games, which may be of
independent interest. We then show that Labor Union games have additional desirable properties:
in such games α-Nash dynamics quickly converges to α-Nash equilibrium; also, if we start with
the state where each player is unaffiliated, the Nash dynamics converges to a Nash equilibrium
after each player gets a chance to move.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After a brief overview of the related work, we
provide the required preliminaries in Section 2. Section 3 deals with β-nice games and lays the
groundwork that will be necessary for the technical results in the next section. Then, in Section 4,
we describe our three classes of games and present our results for these games. Section 5 explains
the relationship between our games and the well-studied cut games. Section 6 presents our conclu-
sions and directions for future work.
Related Work The games studied in this paper belong to the class of potential games,
introduced by Monderer and Shapley [MS96]. In potential games, any sequence of im-
provements by players converges to a pure Nash equilibrium. However, the number of
steps can be exponential in the description of the game. The complexity of computing
(approximate) Nash equilibrium in various subclasses of potential games such as conges-
tion games [Ros73], cut games [SY91] or party affiliation games [FPT04] has received a
lot of attention in recent years [DSJ88,FPT04,CMS06,SV08,Tsc10,BCK10]. A related is-
sue is how long it takes for some form of best response dynamics to reach an equilib-
rium [MV04,GMV05,CS07,ARV08,SV08,AAE+08]. Even if a Nash equilibrium cannot be
reached quickly, a state reached after a polynomial number of steps may still have high social
welfare; this question is studied, for example, in [CMS06,FFM08,FM09].
A recent paper by Gairing and Savani [GS10] studies the dynamics of a class of cooperative
games known as additively separable hedonic games; their focus is on the complexity of comput-
ing stable outcomes. While the class of all convex cooperative games considered in this paper is
considerably broader than that of additively separable games, paper [GS10] also studies notions of
stability not considered here.
2 Preliminaries
Non-cooperative games. A non-cooperative game is defined by a tuple G =
(N, (Σi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N), where N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is the set of players, Σi is the set of (pure) strate-
gies of player i, and ui : ×i∈NΣi → R+ ∪ {0} is the payoff function of player i.
Let Σ = ×i∈NΣi be the strategy profile set or state set of the game, and let S =
(s1, s2, . . . , sn) ∈ Σ be a generic state in which each player i chooses strategy si ∈ Σi. Given
a strategy profile S = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) and a strategy s′i ∈ Σi, let (S−i, s′i) be the strategy
profile obtained from S by changing the strategy of player i from si to s′i, i.e., (S−i, s
′
i) =
(s1, s2, . . . , si−1, s′i, si+1, . . . , sn).
Nash equilibria and dynamics. Given a strategy profile S = (s1, s2, . . . , sn), a strategy s′i ∈ Σi
is an improvement move for player i if ui(S−i, s′i) > ui(S); further, s
′
i is called an α-improvement
move for i if ui(S−i, s′i) > (1 + α)ui(S), where α > 0. A strategy s
b
i ∈ Σi is a best response
for player i in state S if it yields the maximum possible payoff given the strategy choices of the
other players, i.e., ui(S−i, sbi) ≥ ui(S−i, s′i) for any s′i ∈ Σi. An α-best response move is both an
α-improvement and a best response move.
A (pure) Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile in which every player plays her best response.
Formally, S = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) is a Nash equilibrium if for all i ∈ N and for any strategy s′i ∈ Σi
we have ui(S) ≥ ui(S−i, s′i). We denote the set of all (pure) Nash equilibria of a game G by
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NE(G). A profile S = (s1, . . . , sn) is called an α-Nash equilibrium if no player can improve his
payoff by more than a factor of (1+α) by deviating, i.e., (1+α)ui(S) ≥ ui(S−i, s′i) for any i ∈ N
and any u′i ∈ Σi. The set of all α-Nash equilibria of G is denoted by NEα(G). In a strong Nash
equilibrium, no group of players can improve their payoffs by deviating, i.e., S = (s1, . . . , sn) is
a strong Nash equilibrium if for all I ⊆ N and any strategy vector S ′ = (s′1, . . . , s′n) such that
s′i = si for i ∈ N \ I , if ui(S ′) > ui(S) for some i ∈ I , then uj(S ′) < uj(S) for some j ∈ I .
Let ∆i(S) be the improvement in the player’s payoff if he performs his best response, i.e.,
∆i(S) = ui(S−i, sbi)−ui(S), where sbi is the best response of player i in state S. For any Z ⊆ N let
∆Z(S) =
∑
i∈Z ∆i(S), and let ∆(S) = ∆N(S). A Nash dynamic (respectively, α-Nash dynamic)
is any sequence of best response (respectively, α-best response) moves. A basic Nash dynamic
(respectively, basic α-Nash dynamic) is any Nash dynamic (respectively, α-Nash dynamic) such
that at each state S the player i that makes a move has the maximum absolute improvement, i.e.,
i ∈ arg maxj∈N ∆j(S).
Price of anarchy. Given a game G with a set of states Σ, and a function f : Σ → R+ ∪ {0},
we write OPTf (G) = maxS∈Σ f(S). The price of anarchy PoAf (G) and the price of stabil-
ity PoSf (G) of a game G with respect to a function f are, respectively, the worst-case ra-
tio and the best-case ratio between the value of f in a Nash equilibrium and OPTf (G), i.e.,
PoAf (G) = maxS∈NE(G) OPTf (G)f(S) , PoSf (G) = minS∈NE(G)
OPTf (G)
f(S)
. The strong price of anarchy
and the strong price of stability are defined similarly; the only difference is that the maximum
(respectively, minimum) is taken over all strong Nash equilibria. Further, the α-price of anarchy
PoAαf (G) of a game G with respect to f is defined as PoAαf (G) = maxS∈NEα(G) OPTf (G)f(S) ; the α-price
of stability PoSαf (G) can be defined similarly. Originally, these notions were defined with respect
to the social welfare function, i.e., f =
∑
i∈N ui(S). However, we give a more general definition
since in the setting of this paper it is natural to use a different function f . We omit the index f
when the function f is clear from the context.
Potential games. A non-cooperative game G is called a potential game if there is a function
Φ : Σ → N such that for any state S and any improvement move s′i of a player i in S we have
Φ(S−i, s′i) − Φ(S) > 0; the function Φ is called the potential function of G. The game G is called
an exact potential game if we have Φ(S−i, s′i)− Φ(S) = ui(S−i, s′i)− ui(S). It is known that any
potential game has a pure Nash equilibrium [MS96,Ros73].
Cooperative games. A cooperative game G = (N, v) is given by a set of players N and a
characteristic function v : 2N → R+ ∪ {0} that for each set I ⊆ N specifies the profit that
the players in I can earn by working together. We assume that v(∅) = 0. A coalition structure
over N is a partition of players in N , i.e., a collection of sets I1, . . . , Ik such that (i) Ii ⊆ N for
i = 1, . . . , k; (ii) Ii ∩ Ij = ∅ for all i < j ≤ k; and (iii) ∪kj=1Ij = N . A game G = (N, v)
is called monotone if v is non-decreasing, i.e., v(I) ≤ v(J) for any I ⊂ J ⊆ N . Further, G
is called convex if v is submodular, i.e., for any I ⊂ J ⊆ N and any i ∈ N \ J we have
v(I ∪{i})− v(I) ≥ v(J ∪{i})− v(J). Informally, in a convex game a player is more useful when
he joins a smaller coalition. We will make use of the following property of submodular functions.
4
Lemma 1. Let f : 2V → R be a submodular function. Then for any pair of sets X, Y ⊆ V
such that X ∩ Y = ∅ and X = {x1, x2, . . . , xk}, it holds that
∑
j=1,...,k (f(Y ∪ {xj})− f(Y )) ≥
f(Y ∪X)− f(Y ).
Proof. Since f is a submodular function, for every xj ∈ X we have
f(Y ∪ {xj})− f(Y ) ≥ f(Y ∪ {x1, x2, . . . , xj−1, xj})− f(Y ∪ {x1, x2, . . . , xj−1}).
The lemma now follows by summing these inequalities for all j = 1, . . . , k. uunionsq
3 Perfect β-nice Games
In this section, we define the class of perfect β-nice games (our definition is inspired by [AAE+08],
but differs from the one given there), and prove a number of results for such games. Subsequently,
we will show that many of the profit-sharing games considered in the paper belong to this class.
Most proofs in this section are relegated to Appendix A.
Definition 1. A potential game G with a potential function Φ is called perfect with respect to a
function f : Σ → R+ ∪ {0} if for any state S it holds that f(S) ≥ ∑i∈N ui(S), and, moreover,
for any improvement move s′i of player i we have
f(S−i, s′i)− f(S) ≥ Φ(S−i, s′i)− Φ(S) ≥ ui(S−i, s′i)− ui(S).
Also, a game G is called β-nice with respect to f if for every state S we have β · f(S) + ∆(S) ≥
OPTf (G).
We can bound the price of anarchy of a β-nice game by β.
Lemma 2. For any f : Σ → R+∪{0} and any game G that is β-nice w.r.t. f we have PoAf (G) ≤
β.
Proof. The lemma follows by observing that for any Nash equilibrium S we have ∆(S) ≤ 0. uunionsq
Lemma 2 can be extended to α-price of anarchy for any α ≥ 0.
Lemma 3. For any f : Σ → R+∪{0}, any α ≥ 0, and any game G that is β-nice w.r.t. f we have
PoAαf (G) ≤ α + β.
Proof. For any α-Nash equilibrium S we have ∆(S) ≤ α∑i∈N ui(S) ≤ αf(S). uunionsq
We now state a technical lemma that we use shortly in proving Theorem 1.
Lemma 4. Consider any non-cooperative game G and any function f : Σ → R+ ∪ {0}. For
positive values of , a, and b, any dynamic for which the increase in the value of f at a step leading
from S to S¯ is at least b − 1
a
f(S) converges to a state SF with f(SF ) ≥ ab(1 − ) in at most⌈
a ln 1

⌉
steps, from any initial state.
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The next theorem states that after a polynomial number of steps, for every perfect β-nice potential
game, the basic Nash dynamic reaches a state whose relative quality (with respect to f ) is close to
the price of anarchy.
Theorem 1. Consider any function f : Σ → R+ ∪ {0} and any game G that is perfect β-nice
with respect to f . For any  > 0 the basic Nash dynamic converges to a state SF with f(SF ) ≥
OPTf (G)
β
(1− ) in at most ⌈n
β
ln 1

⌉
steps, starting from any initial state.
Proof. Consider a generic state S of the dynamic. Since G is β-nice, we have ∆(S) ≥ OPTf (G)−
β · f(S). Let i be the player moving in state S, and let S¯ be the state resulting from the move of
player i. Since i is the player with the maximum absolute improvement, we get
f(S¯)− f(S) ≥ Φ(S¯)− Φ(S) ≥ ∆i(S) ≥ ∆(S)
n
≥ OPTf (G)− β · f(S)
n
.
The theorem now follows by applying Lemma 4 with b = OPTf (G)
n
and a = n
β
. uunionsq
A convergence result similar to Theorem 1 can be obtained for basic α-Nash dynamic.
Theorem 2. Consider any function f : Σ → R+∪{0} and any game G that is perfect β-nice with
respect to f . For any  > 0 and any α ≥ 0 the basic α-Nash dynamic converges to a state SF with
f(SF ) ≥ OPTf (G)
β+α
(1− ) in at most ⌈ n
β+α
ln 1

⌉
steps, starting from any initial state.
4 Profit-sharing games
In this section, we study three non-cooperative games that can be constructed from an arbitrary
monotone convex cooperative game.
Each of our games can be described by a triple G = (N, v,M), where (N, v) is a monotone
convex cooperative game with N = {1, . . . , n}, and M = {1, . . . ,m} is a set of m parties; we
require m ≤ n. All three games considered in this section model the setting where the players
in N form a coalition structure over N that consists of m coalitions. Thus, each player needs
to choose exactly one party from M , i.e., for each i ∈ N we have Σi = M . In some cases
(see Section 4.2), we also allow players to be unaffiliated. To model this, we expand the set of
strategies by setting Σi = M ∪ {0}. Intuitively, the parties correspond to different companies,
and the players correspond to the potential employees of these companies; we desire to assign
employees to companies so as to maximize the total productivity.
In two of our games (see Section 4.1 and Section 4.3), a state of the game is completely de-
scribed by the assignment of the players to the parties, i.e., we can write S = (s1, . . . , sn), where
si ∈ M for all i ∈ N . Alternatively, we can specify a state of the game by providing a partition of
the set N into m components Q1, . . . , Qm, where Qj is the set of all players that chose party j, i.e.,
we can write S = (Q1, . . . , Qm); we will use both forms of notation throughout the paper. In the
game described in Section 4.2, the state of the game depends not only on which parties the players
chose, but also on the order in which they joined the party; we postpone the formal description
of this model till Section 4.2. In all three models, each player’s payoff is based on the concept of
marginal utility; however, in different models this idea is instantiated in different ways.
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An important parameter of a state S = (Q1, . . . , Qm) in each of these games is its total profit
tp(S) =
∑
j∈M v(Qj). While for the games defined in Section 4.2 and Section 4.3, the total profit
coincides with the social welfare, for the game described in Section 4.1 this is not necessarily the
case. As we are interested in finding the most efficient partition of players into teams, we consider
the total profit of a state a more relevant quantity than its social welfare. Therefore, in what follows,
we will consider the price of anarchy and the price of stability with respect to the total profit, i.e.,
we have OPT(G) = OPTtp(G), PoA(G) = PoAtp(G), PoS(G) = PoStp(G).
All of our results generalize to the setting where each party j ∈M is associated with a different
non-decreasing submodular profit function vj : 2N → R+ ∪ {0}, i.e., different companies possess
different technologies, and therefore may have different levels of productivity. Formally, any such
game is given by a tuple G = (N, v1, . . . , vm,M), whereM = {1, . . . ,m}, and for each j ∈M the
function vj is a non-decreasing submodular function vj : 2N → R+∪{0} that satisfies v(∅) = 0. In
this case, the total profit function in a state S = (Q1, . . . , Qm) is given by tp(S) =
∑
j∈M vj(Qj).
In what follows, we present our results for this more general setting.
4.1 Fair Value games
In our first model, the utility ui(S) of a player i in a state S = (Q1, . . . , Qm) is given by i’s marginal
contribution to the coalition he belongs to, i.e., if i ∈ Qj , we set ui(S) = vj(S)−vj(S\{i}). As this
payment scheme rewards each player according to the value he creates, we will refer to this type of
games as Fair Value games. Observe that since the functions vj are assumed to be submodular, we
have
∑
i∈Qj ui(S) ≤ vj(Qj) for all j ∈ M , i.e., the total payment to the employees of a company
never exceeds the profit of the company. Moreover, it may be the case that the profit of a company
is strictly greater than the amount it pays to its employees; we can think of the difference between
the two quantities as the owner’s/shareholders’ value. Consequently, in these games the total profit
of all parties may differ from the social welfare, as defined in Section 2.
We will now argue that Fair Value games have a number of desirable properties. In particular,
any such game is a potential game, and therefore has a pure Nash equilibrium. The proof of the
following theorem can be found in Appendix B.
Theorem 3. Every Fair Value game G is a perfect 2-nice exact potential game w.r.t. the total profit
function.
Combining Theorem 3, Lemmas 2 and 3 and Theorems 1 and 2, we obtain the following corollar-
ies.
Corollary 1. For every Fair Value game G and every α ≥ 0 we have PoAα(G) ≤ 2 + α. In
particular, PoA(G) ≤ 2.
Corollary 2. For every Fair Value game G and any  > 0, the basic Nash dynamic (respectively,
the basic α-Nash dynamic) converges to a state SF with total profit tp(SF ) ≥ OPT(G)
2
(1 − )
(respectively, tp(SF ) ≥ OPT(G)
2+α
(1 − )) in at most ⌈n
2
ln 1

⌉
steps (respectively,
⌈
n
2+α
ln 1

⌉
steps),
from any initial state.
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Since every Fair Value game is an exact potential game with the potential function given by the total
profit, any profit-maximizing state is necessarily a Nash equilibrium. This implies the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. For any Fair Value game G we have PoS(G) = 1.
4.2 Labor Union Games
In Fair Value games, the player’s payoff only depends on his current marginal value to the enter-
prise, i.e., one’s salary may go down as the company expands. However, in many real-life settings,
this is not the case. For instance, in many industries, especially ones that are highly unionized, an
employee that has spent many years working for the company typically receives a higher salary
than a new hire with the same set of skills. Our second class of games, which we will refer to as
Labor Union games, aims to model this type of settings. Specifically, in this class of games, we
modify the notion of state so as to take into account the order in which the players have joined
their respective parties; the payment to each player is then determined by his marginal utility for
the coalition formed by his predecessors. The submodularity property guarantees than a player’s
payoff never goes down as long as he stays with the same party.
Formally, in a Labor Union game G that corresponds to a tuple (N, v1, . . . , vm,M), we allow
the players to be unaffiliated, i.e., for each i ∈ N we set Σi = M ∪{0}. If player i plays strategy 0,
we set his payoff to be 0 irrespective of the other players’ strategies. A state of G is given by a tuple
P = (P1, . . . , Pm), where Pj is the sequence of players in party j, ordered according to their arrival
time. As before, the profit of party j is given by the function vj; note that the value of vj does not
depend on the order in which the players join j. The payoff of each player, however, is dependent on
their position in the affiliation order. Specifically, for a player i ∈ Pj , let Pj(i) be the set of players
that appear in Pj before i. Player i’s payoff is then defined as ui(P) = vj(Pj(i)∪{i})− vj(Pj(i)).
We remark that, technically speaking, Labor Union games are not non-cooperative games.
Rather, each state of a Labor Union game induces a non-cooperative game as described above;
after any player makes a move, the induced non-cooperative game changes. Abusing terminology,
we will say that a state P of a Labor Union game G is a Nash equilibrium if for each player i ∈ N
staying with his current party is a best response in the induced game; all other notions that were
defined for non-cooperative games in Section 2, as well as the results in Section 3, can be extended
to Labor Union games in a similar manner.
We now state two fundamental properties of our model.
– Guaranteed payoff: Consider two players i and i′ in Pj . Suppose i′ moves to another party.
The payoff of player i will not decrease. Indeed, if i′ succeeds i in the sequence Pj , then by
definition, i’s payoff is unchanged. If i′ precedes i in Pj , then, since vj is non-decreasing and
submodular, i’s payoff will not decrease; it may, however, increase.
– Full payoff distribution: The sum of the payoffs of players within a party j is a telescopic
sum that evaluates to vj(Pj). Therefore, the total profit tp(P) =
∑
j∈M vj(Pj) in a state P
equals to the social welfare in this state. In other words, in Labor Union games, the profit of
each enterprise is distributed among its employees, without creating any value for the own-
ers/shareholders.
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The guaranteed payoff property distinguishes the Labor Union games from the Fair Value games,
where a player who maintains his affiliation to a party might not be rewarded, but may rather see
a reduction in his payoff as other players move to join his party. This, of course, may incentivize
him to shift his affiliation as well, leading to a vicious cycle of moves. In contrast, in Labor Union
games, a player is guaranteed that his payoff will not decrease if he maintains his affiliation to a
party. This suggests that in Labor Union games stability may be easier to achieve. In what follows,
we will see that this is indeed the case.
We will first show that Labor Union games are perfect 2-nice with respect to the total profit
(or, equivalently, social welfare); this will allow us to apply the machinery developed in Section 3.
Abusing notation, let ∆i(P) denote the improvement in the payoff of player i if he performs a best
response move from P , and let ∆(P) = ∑i∈N ∆i(P).
Proposition 2. Any Labor Union game G is a perfect 2-nice game with respect to the total profit
function.
Proof. It is easy to see that G is a potential game with the potential function Φ(P) = tp(P).
Furthermore, for any player i the increase in his payoff when he performs an improvement move
does not exceed the change in the total profit. It remains to show that 2tp(P) + ∆(P) ≥ OPT(G)
for any P = (P1, . . . , Pm). We have
vj(Oj) ≤ vj(Pj ∪Oj) = vj(Pj) + vj(Pj ∪Oj)− vj(Pj) ≤ vj(Pj) +
∑
i∈Oj\Pj
(ui(Pi) +∆i(P)).
Summing over all parties, we obtain
OPT(G) =
∑
j∈M
vj(Oj) ≤
∑
j∈M
vj(Pj) +
∑
j∈M
∑
i∈Oj\Pj
ui(Pi) +
∑
j∈M
∑
i∈Oj\Pj
∆i(P ) ≤ 2tp(P) +∆(P).
uunionsq
As in the case of Fair Value games, Proposition 2 allows us to bound the price of anarchy of any
Labor Union game, as well as the time it takes to converge to a state with a “good” total profit.
Corollary 3. For every Labor Union game G and every α ≥ 0 we have PoAα(G) ≤ 2 + α. In
particular, PoA(G) ≤ 2.
Corollary 4. For every Labor Union game G and any  > 0, the basic Nash dynamic (respectively,
the basic α-Nash dynamic) converges to a state SF with total profit tp(SF ) ≥ OPT(G)
2
(1 − )
(respectively, tp(SF ) ≥ OPT(G)
2+α
(1 − )) in at most ⌈n
2
ln 1

⌉
steps (respectively,
⌈
n
2+α
ln 1

⌉
steps),
from any initial state.
Let Ø(G) = (O1, . . . , Om) be a state that maximizes the total profit in a game G, and let
OPT(G) = tp(Ø(G)). As in the case of Fair Value games, it is not hard to see that Ø(G) is a Nash
equilibrium, i.e., PoS(G) = 1. In fact, for Labor Union games, we can prove a stronger statement.
Proposition 3. In any Labor Union game G, Ø(G) is a strong Nash equilibrium. I.e., the strong
price of stability is 1.
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Proof. Consider a deviating coalition I ⊆ N . By the guaranteed payoff property, the deviation
does not lower the payoff of all players in N \ I and increases the payoff of some of the deviators,
without harming the rest of the deviators. Thus, the deviation must lead to a state whose total
payoff exceeds that of Ø(G), a contradiction. uunionsq
Furthermore, for Labor Union games we can show that for certain dynamics and certain initial
states one can guarantee convergence to α-Nash equilibrium or even Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 4. Consider any Labor Union game G = (N, v1, . . . , vm,M) such that vj(I) ≥ 1 for
any j ∈ M and any I ∈ 2N \ {∅}. For any such G, the α-Nash dynamic starting from any state in
which all players are affiliated with some party converges to an α-Nash equilibrium inO(n
α
logW )
steps. where W is the maximum payoff that any player can achieve.
Proof. After each move in the α-Nash dynamic, a player improves her payoff by a factor of 1 +α,
and the guaranteed payoff property ensures that payoffs of other players are unaffected. So, if a
player starts with a payoff of at least 1, she will reach a payoff ofW afterO( logW
α
) steps. Therefore,
in O(n
α
logW ) steps, we are guaranteed to reach an α-Nash equilibrium. uunionsq
Proposition 5. Suppose a Labor Union game G with n players starts at a state in which every
player is unaffiliated. Then, in exactly n steps of the Nash dynamic, the system will reach a Nash
equilibrium.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the number of steps. The very first player who gets to move will
pick the party that maximizes her payoff. Subsequently, she will never have an incentive to move,
because no move will give her any improvement in her payoff. For the inductive step, suppose that
k − 1 steps have elapsed, and exactly k − 1 players have moved once each and have reached their
final destination with no incentive to move again. The player who moves at step k chooses his best
response party. Since the profit functions are increasing and submodular, he cannot improve his
payoff by moving to another party at a later step. Therefore, in n steps, the system reaches a Nash
equilibrium. uunionsq
We conclude with an important open question. We have shown that for α > 0, the α-Nash
dynamic leads to an α-Nash equilibrium in O(n
α
logW ) steps. However, we do not know whether
there exists a dynamic that converges to a Nash equilibrium in a number of steps that is a polyno-
mial in n and logW .
4.3 Shapley games
In our third class of games, which we call Shapley games, the players’ payoffs are determined in
a way that is inspired by the definition of the Shapley value [S53]. Like in Fair Value games, a
state of a Shapley game is fully described by the partition of the players into parties. Given a state
S = (Q1, . . . , Qm) and a player i ∈ Qj , we define player i’s payoff as
ui(S) =
∑
Q⊆Qj\{i}
|Q|!(|Qj| − |Q| − 1)!
|Qj|! (vj(Q ∪ {i})− vj(Q)).
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Intuitively, the payment to each player can be viewed as his average payment in the Labor Union
model, where the average is taken over all possible orderings of the players in the party. This
immediately implies
∑
i∈Qj ui(S) = vj(Qj). Thus, Shapley games share features with both the
Fair Value games and the Labor Union games. Like Fair Value games, the order in which the
players join the party is unimportant. Moreover, if all payoff functions are additive, i.e., we have
ui(S ∪ {j}) − ui(S) = ui({j}) for any i ∈ N and any S ⊆ N \ {i}, then the respective Shapley
game coincides with the Fair Value game that corresponds to (N, v1, . . . , vm,M). On the other
hand, similarly to the Labor Union games, the entire profit of each party is distributed among its
members. We will first show that any Shapley game is an exact potential game and hence admits a
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies (all proofs in this section are deferred to Appendix C).
Theorem 4. Any Shapley game G = (N, v1, . . . , vm,M), is an exact potential game with the
potential function given by
Φ(S) =
∑
j∈M
∑
Q⊆Qj
(|Q| − 1)!(|Qj| − |Q|)!
|Qj|! vj(Q).
Just like in other profit-sharing games, the price of anarchy in Shapley games is bounded by 2.
Theorem 5. In any Shapley game G = (N, v1, . . . , vm,M) with |N | = n, we have PoA(G) ≤
2− 1
n
.
The following claim shows that the bound given in Theorem 5 is almost tight.
Proposition 6. For any n ≥ 3, there exists a Shapley game G = (N, v1, v2,M) with |N | = n and
|M | = 2 such that PoA(G) = 2− 2
n+1
and PoS(G) = 2− 4
n+1
.
5 Cut Games and Profit Sharing Games
We will now describe a family of succinctly representable profit-sharing games that can be de-
scribed in terms of undirected weighted graphs. It turns out that while two well-studied classes
of games on such graphs do not induce profit-sharing games, a “hybrid” approach does. We then
explain how to compute players’ payoffs in the resulting profit-sharing games.
In the classic cut games [SY91,FPT04,CMS06], players are the vertices of a weighted graph
G = (N,E). The state of the game is a partition of players into two parties, and the payoff of
each player is the sum of the weights of cut edges that are incident on him. A cut game naturally
corresponds to a coalitional game with the set of players N , where the value of a coalition S ⊆ N
equals to the weight of the cut induced by S and N \ S. However, this game is not monotone, so it
does not induce a profit-sharing game, as defined in Section 4.
In induced subgraph games [DP94], the value of a coaliton S equals to the total weight of all
edges that have both endpoints in S; while these games are monotone, they are not convex.
Finally, consider a game where the value of a coalition S ⊆ N equals the total weight of all
edges incident on vertices in S, i.e., both internal edges of S (as in induced subgraph games) and
the edges leaving S (as in cut games). It is not hard to see that this game is both monotone and
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convex, and hence induces a profit-sharing game as described in Section 4. We will now explain
how to compute players’ payoffs in the corresponding Fair Value games, Labor Union games and
Shapley games, using Figure 1. In this figure, we are given a state of the game with two parties S
and N \ S; the players are listed from top to bottom in the order in which they (last) entered each
party. (The order is relevant only in Labor Union games.) A (resp., B) denotes the total weight of
edges incident on i that connect i to a predecessor (resp., successor) within the party. C is the total
weight of the cut edges incident on i. One can interpret an edge e = (i, i′) with weight w(e) as a
skill or resource of value proportional to w(e) that both i and i′ possess.
Fair Value Games: The payoff of i (see Figure 1) is given by A+B
2
+ C. Intuitively, the unique
skills of a player are weighted more toward his payoff than his shared skills.
Labor Union Games: The payoff of i is given by B+C. Intuitively, i’s payoff reflects the unique
skills that i possessed when he joined the party. Players who share skills with i, but join after i,
will not get any payoff for those shared skills.
Shapley Games: One can show that i’s payoff is given by A+B
2
+ C, just as in Fair Value games.
One can see that this interpretation easily extends to multiple parties and hyperedges. We also note
that many of the notions that we have discussed are naturally meaningful in this variant of the cut
game: for instance, an optimal state for m = 2 is a configuration in which the weighted cut size is
maximized.
A
B
C
Order of arrival
i
S N \ S
Fig. 1. The setN of players is partitioned into parties S andN \S. Consider a player i.A (resp.,B)
denotes the total weight of edges incident on i and connecting i to a predecessor (resp., successor)
within the party. C is the total weight of the cut edges incident on i.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we studied the dynamics of coalition formation under marginal contribution-based
profit division schemes. We have introduced three classes of non-cooperative games that can be
constructed from any convex cooperative game. We have shown that all three profit distribution
schemes considered in this paper have desirable properties: all three games admit a Nash equilib-
rium, and even the worst Nash equilibrium is within a factor of 2 from the optimal configuration.
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In addition, for Fair Value games and Labor Union games a natural dynamic process quickly con-
verges to a state with a fairly high total profit. Thus, when rules for sharing the payoff are fixed in
advance, we can expect a system composed of bounded-rational selfish players to quickly converge
to an acceptable set of teams.
Of course, the picture given by our results is far from complete; rather, our work should be seen
as a first step towards understanding the behavior of myopic selfish agents in coaliton formation
settings. In particular, our results seem to suggest that keeping track of the history of the game and
distributing payoffs in a way that respects players “seniority” leads to better stability properties; it
would be interesting to see if this observation is true in practice, and whether it generalizes to other
settings, such as congestion games.
In contrast to the previous work on cost-sharing and profit-sharing games, our work does not
assume that the game’s payoffs are given by an underlying combinatorial structure. Rather, our
results hold for any convex cooperative game, and, in particular, do not depend on whether it is
compactly representable. Further, all of our results are non-computational in nature. Indeed, since
the standard representation of cooperative games is exponential in the number of players, one
can only hope to obtain meaningful complexity results for subclasses of cooperative games that
possess a succinct representation; identifying such classes and proving complexity results for them
is a promising research direction.
In our study of Labor Union games, we took a somewhat unusual modeling approach: we
considered a system described by a sequence of states, each of which induces a non-cooperative
game, and proved convergence results about the dynamics of such systems. This approach can
be extended to other classes of games such as, e.g., congestion games; indeed, there are real-life
systems where a player’s payoff depends on who selected a certain resource before him. It would
be interesting to see if the known results for congestion games extend to this setting.
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A Proofs for Section 3
A.1 Proof of Lemma 4
From the hypothesis we have f(S¯)− f(S) ≥ b− 1
a
f(S). Let h(S) = b− 1
a
f(S). Then
h(S)− h(S¯) = 1
a
(f(S¯)− f(S)) ≥ 1
a
h(S).
Hence,
h(S¯) ≤
(
1− 1
a
)
h(S). (1)
Consider a state SF that is reached by the dynamic starting from a state SI in t steps. By recursively
applying (1), we get
h(SF ) ≤
(
1− 1
a
)t
h(SI).
By setting t = da ln h(SI)
b
e ≤ da ln 1

e in the previous inequality, we derive that h(SF ) ≤ b. Thus
we obtain f(SF ) = ab
(
1− h(SF )
b
)
≥ ab(1− ). uunionsq
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Let us consider a generic state S = (s1, . . . , sn) of the dynamic. Let U ⊆ N be the subset of
players that can perform an α-best-response move, and let E = N \ U . Note that no player i ∈ E
can improve his payoff by more than a factor of 1 + α by deviating from his current strategy, i.e.,
∆E(S) ≤ α
∑
i∈E ui(S) ≤ αf(S). By definition of a perfect β-nice game, we have
∆E(S) +∆U(S) = ∆(S) ≥ OPTf (G)− β · f(S).
Let i be the player moving in state S, and let S¯ be the state resulting from the move of player
i ∈ U . Since i is the player with the maximum absolute improvement among the players in U , we
get
f(S¯)− f(S)≥ Φ(S¯)− Φ(S)
≥∆i(S)
≥ ∆U(S)|U |
≥ OPTf (G)− β · f(S)−∆E(S)
n
≥ OPTf (G)− β · f(S)− α · f(S)
n
=
OPTf (G)
n
− β + α
n
f(S).
The theorem now follows by applying Lemma 4 with b = OPTf (G)
n
and a = n
β+α
. uunionsq
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B Proof of Theorem 3
It is easy to see that G is an exact potential game, where the potential function is given by the total
profit. In order to prove the theorem, we need to show that for each state S we have 2 · tp(S) +
∆(S) ≥ OPT(G). Consider any state S = (s1, s2, . . . , sn), and let S ′ = (s′1, s′2, . . . , s′n) be the
state of best responses to S, that is, let s′i be the best response of player i in state S. Moreover, let
S∗ = (s∗1, s
∗
2, . . . , s
∗
n) be a state that maximizes the total profit. Consider a party k ∈ M , and let
Qk = {i ∈ N | si = k}, Q∗k = {i ∈ N | s∗i = k}. We obtain
∆Q∗k(S) =
∑
j∈Q∗k
(
uj(S−j, s′j)− uj(S)
)
≥
∑
j∈Q∗k
(uj(S−j, k)− uj(S)) (2)
=
∑
j∈Q∗k
uj(S−j, k)−
∑
j∈Q∗k
uj(S)
=
∑
j∈Q∗k\Qk
(vk(Qk ∪ {j})− vk(Qk)) +
∑
j∈Q∗k∩Qk
uj(S)−
∑
j∈Q∗k
uj(S)
≥ vk(Qk ∪ (Q∗k \Qk))− vk(Qk)−
∑
j∈Q∗k
uj(S) (3)
≥ vk(Q∗k)− vk(Qk)−
∑
j∈Q∗k
uj(S), (4)
where (2) holds because for each player j the improvement from selecting the best response s′j
is at least the improvement achieved by choosing the optimal strategy s∗j = k, (3) follows from
Lemma 1, whereas (4) holds because vk is non-decreasing.
By summing these inequalities over all parties k, we obtain
∆(S) =
∑
k∈M
∆Q∗k(S)≥
∑
k∈M
vk(Q
∗
k)−
∑
k∈M
vk(Qk)−
∑
k∈M
∑
j∈Q∗k
uj(S)
= tp(S∗)− tp(S)−
∑
j∈N
uj(S)
≥ OPT(G)− 2tp(S). (5)
where (5) follows from the fact that for every state S we have
∑
j∈N uj(S) ≤ tp(S). uunionsq
C Proofs for Section 4.3
C.1 Proof of Theorem 4
Suppose that in some state S = (Q1, . . . , Qm) of the game a player i that belongs to party 1
wants to switch to party 2. Let S ′ be the state after player i switches. Our goal is to show that
ui(S
′)− ui(S) = Φ(S ′)− Φ(S), so Φ is indeed a potential function of the game.
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We can compute the utility of player i in both states, taking into account that in state S player i
belongs to party 1 with |Q1|members, but in state S ′ she belongs to party 2 with |Q2+1|members:
ui(S
′) =
∑
Q⊆Q2
|Q|!(|Q2| − |Q|)!
(|Q2|+ 1)! (v2(Q ∪ {i})− v2(Q)),
ui(S) =
∑
Q⊆Q1\{i}
|Q|!(|Q1| − |Q| − 1)!
|Q1|! (v1(Q ∪ {i})− v1(Q)).
The only parties whose composition changes as we move from state S to state S ′ are party 1 and
party 2. Therefore, when computing the difference between Φ(S ′) and Φ(S), we can ignore all
other parties:
Φ(S ′)− Φ(S) =
∑
Q⊆Q1\{i}
(|Q| − 1)!(|Q1| − 1− |Q|)!
(|Q1| − 1)! v1(Q)
+
∑
Q⊆Q2∪{i}
(|Q| − 1)!(|Q2|+ 1− |Q|)!
(|Q2|+ 1)! v2(Q)
−
∑
Q⊆Q1
(|Q| − 1)!(|Q1| − |Q|)!
|Q1|! v1(Q)
−
∑
Q⊆Q2
(|Q| − 1)!(|Q2| − |Q|)!
|Q2|! v2(Q)
=
∑
Q⊆Q2
((
(|Q| − 1)!(|Q2|+ 1− |Q|)!
(|Q2|+ 1)! −
(|Q| − 1)!(|Q2| − |Q|)!
|Q2|!
)
v2(Q)
+
(|Q|)!(|Q2| − |Q|)!
(|Q2|+ 1)! v2(Q ∪ {i})
)
+
∑
Q⊆Q1\{i}
((
(|Q| − 1)!(|Q1| − 1− |Q|)!
(|Q1| − 1)! −
(|Q| − 1)!(|Q1| − |Q|)!
|Q1|!
)
v1(Q)
− (|Q|)!(|Q1| − |Q| − 1)!|Q1|! v1(Q ∪ {i})
)
=
∑
Q⊆Q2
|Q|!(|Q2| − |Q|)!
(|Q2|+ 1)! (v2(Q ∪ {i})− v2(Q))
−
∑
Q⊆Q1\{i}
|Q|!(|Q1| − |Q| − 1)!
|Q1|! (v1(Q ∪ {i})− v1(Q))
= ui(S
′)− ui(S).
uunionsq
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C.2 Proof of Theorem 5
Let S = (Q1, . . . , Qm) be a Nash equilibrium state, and let S∗ = (Q∗1, . . . , Q
∗
m) be a state where
the maximum total profit is achieved. It suffices to show that (1− 1
n
)tp(S) + tp(S) ≥ tp(S∗).
Observe first that if |Qj| = n for some j ∈ M , then S is an optimal state. Indeed, if S is not
optimal, by the total payoff distribution property there exists a party k ∈ M and a player i ∈ Q∗k
such that ui(S∗) > ui(S). If player i switches to party k, which currently has no members, by
submodularity property his payoff will be at least ui(S∗), a contradiction with S being a Nash
equilibrium state. Therefore, from now on, we assume that |Qj| < n for all j ∈M .
Now, we have
tp(S) =
∑
i∈N
ui(S) =
∑
j∈M
∑
i∈Q∗j
ui(S).
For any j ∈ M and all i ∈ Q∗j , we can derive a lower bound on ui(S). There are two cases to be
considered.
(1) If i ∈ Qj , we have
ui(S) =
∑
Q⊆Qj\{i}
|Q|!(|Qj| − |Q| − 1)!
|Qj|! (vj(Q ∪ {i})− vj(Q))
>
∑
Q⊂Qj\{i}
|Q|!(|Qj| − |Q|)!
(|Qj|+ 1)! (vj(Q ∪ {i})− vj(Q)).
(2) If i /∈ Qj , we have
ui(S) ≥
∑
Q⊆Qj
|Q|!(|Qj| − |Q|)!
(|Qj|+ 1)! (vj(Q ∪ {i})− vj(Q)),
since S is a Nash equilibrium, and hence player i cannot increase his utility by switching to
party j.
Changing the order of summation, by Lemma 1, we have
tp(S) ≥
∑
j∈M
∑
Q⊆Qj
|Q|!(|Qj| − |Q|)!
(|Qj|+ 1)! (vj(Q ∪Q
∗
j)− vj(Q)).
Set q = |Qj|. We have∑
Q⊆Qj
|Q|!(|Qj| − |Q|)!
(|Qj|+ 1)! =
q∑
i=0
∑
Q⊆Qj ,|Q|=i
|Q|!(|Qj| − |Q|)!
(|Qj|+ 1)! =
q∑
i=0
(
q
i
)
i!(q − i)!
(q + 1)!
=
q∑
i=0
1
q + 1
= 1;
this identity can also be derived by considering Shapley values in an additive game with |Qj| + 1
players. Further, we have vj(Q ∪Q∗j) ≥ vj(Q∗j). Thus,
tp(S) ≥
∑
j∈M
vj(Q
∗
j)−
∑
j∈M
∑
Q⊆Qj
|Q|!(|Qj| − |Q|)!
(|Qj|+ 1)! vj(Q). (6)
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For any Q ⊆ Qj , we have vj(Q) ≤ vj(Qj), and, moreover, vj(∅) = 0. Recall also that we assume
that |Qj| < n for all j ∈M . Thus we can bound the negative term in the right-hand side of (6) as∑
j∈M
∑
Q⊆Qj ,Q 6=∅
|Q|!(|Qj| − |Q|)!
(|Qj|+ 1)! vj(Qj) =
∑
j∈M
(1− 0!(|Qj| − 0)!
(|Qj|+ 1)! )vj(Qj) ≤ (1−
1
n
)tp(S). (7)
Combining (6) and (7), we obtain (2− 1/n)tp(S) ≥ tp(S∗). uunionsq
C.3 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. Let v1 be an additive function given by v1({1}) = 1n , v1({i}) = 1n−1 for i ≥ 2, and let
v2(Q) = 1 for any Q 6= ∅.
The state S∗ = (Q∗1, Q
∗
2) with Q
∗
1 = {2, . . . , n}, Q∗2 = {1} has total profit (n− 1) 1n−1 + 1 = 2,
which is the optimum in this game.
On the other hand, a state S = (Q1, Q2) with Q1 = {1}, Q2 = {2, . . . , n} is a Nash equilib-
rium. Indeed, player 1 is paid 1/n and will be paid the same amount if he switches parties, so he
has no incentive to switch. All other players are paid 1
n−1 , and any of them will be paid the same
amount if he switches to the first party. Therefore none of them has an incentive to switch either.
The total profit in state S is 1+ 1
n
. There is no Nash equilibrium with a smaller total profit, because
in any Nash equilibrium state there are players in both parties, and hence the total profit is at least
1
n
+ 1. Thus, PoA(G) = 2
1+1/n
= 2− 2
n+1
.
In any Nash equilibrium, party 2 contains at least n − 2 players. Hence, the total profit in any
Nash equilibrium is at most 2
n−1 + 1. This profit is achieved in, e.g., state S
′ = (Q′1, Q
′
2) with
Q′1 = {n− 1, n}, Q′2 = {1, . . . , n− 2}. Therefore, PoS(G) = 21+2/(n−1) = 2− 4n+1 . uunionsq
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